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ABSTRACT 
 
Many scholars have argued that there are strong incentives for states to spend less 
money on redistributive or consumption programs, such as welfare, and more on 
developmental or investment programs, such as highways. Yet, over the last few 
decades, the proportion of state budgets allocated to expenditures intended to develop 
human and physical capital, specifically education and highways, has declined. In real 
terms, spending on virtually every government program has increased but expenditure 
increases to redistributive programs have been much greater than those to investment 
programs. Why this shift has happened despite theory predicting the contrary has not 
been adequately examined in a way that considers multiple developmental programs 
and multiple ways of conceptualizing spending over a substantial time period. We 
undertake this task in the following article using a large, cross-sectional time series data 
set of state budgeting toward K-12 education, higher education, and highways from 
1965 to 2004. We test competing theories of the determinants of state spending using 
these data and then discuss the factors that we believe have led to the relative de-
emphasis on developmental programs. We find that the most consistent predictors of 
state developmental spending patterns are federal grants, the state of the economy, 
and interstate and intrastate competition. 
 
We are barraged daily with the consequences of America’s apparent declining 
investment in its people and infrastructure. The deadly 2007 bridge collapse in 
Minnesota brought issues of highway maintenance and funding to the forefront (Saulny 
and Steinhauer 2007). The decline of the primary and secondary educational system 
can be seen in comparison with other industrialized nations that produce a greater 
percentage of high school graduates and perform better on standardized tests (Basken 
2006). Similarly, the US higher education system fails to provide enough educated and 
skilled professionals needed for the new information economy according to many 
experts. Even the state of California, long the leader in U.S. public higher education, is 
projected to see a deficit of needed college graduates within several years (Ferriss 
2007). Though many people point to the federal government for solutions to these 
problems, these developmental programs have traditionally been largely funded and 
controlled by state governments. 
 
Although spending on welfare programs has received a great deal of attention from 
political scientists, probably because of the controversial and therefore ‘‘political’’ nature 
of the issue area, a detailed understanding of why states spend money on 
developmental or investment programs is long overdue. Therefore, in the following 
article, we examine various theories of state budgetary decision making in order to 
understand why states allocate scarce resources to developmental or investment 
programs, which will ultimately shed light on why the relative allocations to these 
programs have been declining in recent years. We use the literature on state budgeting 
and studies of particular developmental programs to derive our theoretical expectations 
for changes in spending on K-12 education, higher education, and highways from 1965 
to 2004. We consider demand for spending on particular programs, political factors such 
as partisanship and ideology, federal grants, interstate competition, intrastate budgetary 
tradeoffs, and economic context as possible determinants of state developmental 
spending decisions. 
 
Declining state investment? 
There is much discussion of America’s declining investment in its people and 
infrastructure, and indeed, in recent decades, state support for education and highways, 
measured as a proportion of the average state budget, has declined substantially. 
According to Census Department data taken from the Annual Survey of State and Local 
Government Finances, in the late 1960s, the average state allocated approximately 
59% of its own-source budget (i.e., excluding intergovernmental grants) to education (K-
12 and higher) and highways, but by 2004, this average was approximately 42%. There 
is variation to these patterns by expenditure program, however. Highways and higher 
education have steadily received a smaller percentage of the average state budget, 
whereas K-12 education’s share of the average actually expanded slightly through the 
late 1990s before contracting again in recent years. According to Census Department 
data, K-12 education’s share increased from 21.5% to 23.9% of the average state own-
source budget between 1965 and 1999 and then declined to 19.98% of the budget by 
2004. This slight overall decrease in the proportion of state budgets allocated to K-12 is 
significant considering that states now play a much larger role relative to local 
governments in the financing of public education in the states. According to Carey 
(2002), the percentage of funding for K-12 education coming from state governments 
has risen from 30% to 49% from 1940 to 1999. In other words, as the state 
government’s role in K-12 education has expanded substantially, the proportion of state 
budgets devoted to K-12 had increased only slightly. In contrast to the overall increase 
for K-12 spending, during this same period, higher education’s share of the average 
state budget decreased from 17.4% to 15.5% and highway spending decreased from 
18.7% to 6.1% of the average state budget. Given that highway expenditures are often 
devoted to maintenance and upkeep, it is much easier to delay spending in this area 
(Garand and Hendrick 1991), and states have done this recently. 
 
Viewing spending on these programs as a share of the budget partly distorts what has 
happened over the last several decades, however, since on a per capita basis, it has 
expanded. We note that even in the case of highways, which has seen the largest 
reduction of these programs in terms of budget share, per capita state own-source 
spending in inflation-adjusted dollars has actually risen from 1965 to 2004 by 
approximately $60. Higher and K-12 educations have seen even larger per capita 
expenditure increases during the same time period ($440 and $590, respectively). 
Spending on these programs as a proportion of the state’s gross state product (GSP) or 
personal income has shown more variation but has increased substantially relative to 
the 1965 baseline though it is lower than during the peak years of the late 1960s.1 
Measured as a percentage of personal income, spending on higher education and K-12 
education has increased by about 50% each between 1965 and 2004. Of course many 
would say that even the increases have not been enough given the even more rapidly 
increasing demands placed on the education system— more college attendees, more 
nonnative English speakers in many states, etc. In contrast, spending on highways 
measured as a percentage of personal income has actually declined by about 40% from 
1965 to 2004. 
 
Although absolute spending on developmental programs has actually increased over 
time, state government spending on other functions has obviously risen much more 
rapidly. For example, while spending on highways has increased by approximately 15%, 
state own source spending on welfare has increased by approximately 360% between 
the 1960s and the 1990s. Additionally, spending on prisons, which constituted a very 
small portion of the typical state budget in the 1960s, now consumes a fairly sizeable 
portion of the budget in some states. In a somewhat extreme example, projections 
indicate that in California spending on prisons will consume a larger portion of the 
budget than higher education by the year 2011 (Sterngold 2007). Thus, although 
spending on most government programs has increased in real terms, the relative 
increase on highways and higher education has been substantially lower than other 
government programs, resulting in these programs receiving a smaller proportion of 
state budgets. 
 
Jones (1990) calls expenditures on these education and transportation programs 
‘‘investment spending’’ because they replenish the tax base by expanding subsequent 
economic growth, whereas other scholars call them developmental spending (Peterson 
1995). We use the terms interchangeably throughout this article. While Jones (1990) 
notes that all spending has multiple purposes and consequences, welfare and health 
care, which are among the largest categories of state spending, are generally 
1 GSP data are not available for all states prior to the 1980s, so we use spending as a percentage of personal income throughout 
this article. 
                                                          
considered consumption or redistributive spending; transportation (traditionally 
highways) and increasingly education are considered investment or developmental 
spending (Brace 1993; Hwang and Gray 1991; Jones 1990; Peterson 1995; Smith and 
Rademacker 1999)2 because they are alleged to increase business investment and 
increase economic growth and development. For example, spending on highways may 
attract businesses that can use this system to distribute their products. Similarly, 
education spending may increase productivity by producing higher skilled employees, 
and businesses may wish to expand, invest, or locate in an area with better schools that 
are given more resources by the government. This does not mean that all state policy 
makers view these programs in such black or white terms. For example, Bailey, Rom, 
and Taylor (2004) find that states appear to view higher education as consumption or 
redistributive rather than developmental spending. Nonetheless, it is intuitive that over 
the long run, a failure to invest in these developmental programs will lead to lower rates 
of economic growth in the future. Jones (1990) finds that state education and highway 
spending appear to positively influence economic growth in some time periods, but 
statistical studies have not been able to examine the long-term influence of these 
expenditures because we lack systematic, state-level data prior to the 1950s. 
 
Why state governments have reduced the proportion of government spending on these 
investment programs is puzzling in light of the existence of theories that claim that 
states should compete to have economies most attractive to business investment. 
According to Peterson (1995), subnational governments should therefore feel pressure 
to reduce expenditures on redistributive programs and increase expenditures on 
developmental programs. This has not happened, but there remain pressures on state 
policy makers to respond to mandates of the federal government or state or federal 
courts. 
 
We do not know for certain why states have made these decisions. Compared to 
expenditures on welfare programs, developmental programs have been studied less 
often, presumably, because of their more consensual nature which makes them less 
interesting to scholars. Yet developmental programs are clearly very important and still 
constitute a large portion of the typical state budget, and therefore, understanding why 
states spend what they do on these programs is critically important. Although state 
budget allocations to these programs have generally been similar, there is still 
substantial variation across the states. We therefore seek to better understand the 
factors that influence state expenditures on developmental programs. 
 
 
Explaining State Allocations To Developmental Programs 
There are several factors that research on state budgets indicates should influence 
spending on developmental programs. In the following section, we discuss the most 
important of these factors—federal policies, economic cycles, competition (from other 
states and for programs within states), and state politics. We then test the influence of 
2 In his earlier work, Peterson (1981) views education spending as allocational rather than developmental, but more recent work 
generally considers education spending to be developmental (Hwang and Gray 1991; Smith and Rademacker 1999). 
                                                          
these factors using a substantial data set on state budgets from 1965 to 2004. 
 
 
 
Fiscal Federalism 
Many scholars have noted that federal policies influence state spending decisions 
through federal mandates and the grant-making process (Nice 1987). Different grants 
are designed to achieve different ends, but in general, scholars have found that $1 in 
grant money leads to a greater spending increase than a dollar in tax revenue would, 
which has been called the ‘‘flypaper effect’’ (Hines and Thaler 1995). For example, 
Kane, Orszag, and Gunter (2002) argue that changes in the federal Medicaid program 
appear to have resulted in an increase in state spending on this program and a 
reduction in higher education spending. Nicholson- Crotty, Theobald, and Dan Wood 
(2006) show that the pattern of federal grants to the states creates incentives for states 
to spend on certain programs and not on others. 
] 
Programs that require matching expenditures should most likely stimulate greater state 
spending, though scholars have observed the flypaper effect even with grant programs 
that do not require matching (Chubb 1985; Dye 1988). There is by no means universal 
agreement on the effect that federal grants have on spending, however. For example, 
Bailey and Rom (2004) fail to observe any relationship between federal grants and state 
own-source spending on welfare, and Knight (2002) argues that empirical support for 
the flypaper effect results from model misspecification. Despite the disagreement, it is 
clearly necessary to account for the possible effect of federal grants on state spending. 
We expect that greater emphasis in federal grant making on developmental programs 
will result in greater state spending on these programs. 
 
Economic Cycles 
Additionally, state governments tax and spend in the context of economic cycles of 
rising and falling growth. When income and economic growth increase, states collect 
more tax revenue enabling more developmental spending since these investments in 
human and physical capital often require large expenditures without any immediate 
benefit in terms of economic growth. Kane, Orszag, and Gunter (2002) point out that 
investment in higher education is highly cyclical with increases during good economic 
times. It is no coincidence that such examples of state investment as the system of 
colleges and universities in California were financed during the long postwar economic 
boom of the 1950s and 1960s. Conversely, during economic downturns, investment 
spending is often reduced. This is especially likely to be the case with transportation 
and spending on higher education. For higher education programs, spending reductions 
are often offset with tuition or fee increases on students or salary or hiring freezes. 
Similarly, transportation projects are often delayed until the budget outlook improves 
(Garand and Hendrick 1991), and thus, states should allocate relatively more money to 
education and highway programs during economic expansions and less during 
recessions. 
 
Intrastate Competition, Interstate Competition, and Demand 
We consider both interstate and intrastate competition as factors that may influence 
state spending on developmental programs. The intrastate competition surrounding the 
budget process is characterized by the unlimited wants of different constituencies and 
the finite resources that government has to provide for these needs in a given fiscal 
year. 
 
The policy determinants literature has observed a strong relationship between 
demographics and state spending (Dye 1966, 1979).Onereason for this is that 
demographics reflect varying levels of demand for public services, and the composition 
of state budgets partly reflects these competing demands for government services. Any 
analysis of state expenditures must account for this demand function. For example, a 
state with many children will have a greater demandfor education compared to a state 
with few children, and this should increase education spending (Dye 1988). Similarly, a 
state with many automobile users may also have greater demand for spending on 
highways than a state with fewer automobiles. 
 
There are also constituencies that demand nondevelopmental or consumption spending 
programs like health care and welfare. The demand for this type of government 
spending is likely to be greatest in states with larger numbers of poor people or those 
who can most afford it. To the extent that the demands for more consumption spending 
are met, this should influence reductions in allocations to developmental programs due 
to the existence of budgetary trade-offs (Berry and Lowery 1990; Nicholson-Crotty, 
Theobald, and Dan Wood 2006; Garand and Hendrick 1991; Hendrick and Garand 
1991). As noted above, Kane, Orszag, and Gunter (2002) argued that the expansion of 
the federal Medicaid program in the 1990s resulted in states spending more on this 
health care program and less on higher education. 
 
However, spending in various budgetary categories may be independent of each other 
(Gray 1974), or spending in multiple categories may ebb and flow together. Wildavsky 
(1964) described this in terms of obtaining a ‘‘fair share’’ of the budget, whereas 
Hendrick and Garand (1991) noted the ‘‘mutual change’’ in different policy areas. 
 
We also consider interstate competition as a possible influence on state developmental 
spending decisions. Since subnational politicians in the United States are mostly reliant 
on the investment decisions of the private sector to create economic growth in their 
region, they will often feel pressure to enact policies that create what Lindblom (1977) 
called ‘‘a positive business investment climate.’’ Consequently, scholars have 
considered how economic competition may influence fiscal policy. Since the 
attractiveness of the investment climate is relative, we expect that as competitor states 
enact fiscal policies favored by private sector investors, states will feel pressure to do so 
as well. For example, Phillips (2004) finds that states altered their tax policies in 
response to changes in their economic and regional competitors’ policies. On the 
spending side of fiscal policy, Peterson (1981, 1995) argues that economic competition 
leads to the underprovision of redistributive or consumption programs (e.g., welfare) at 
the state and local level because these programs increase taxes but do not increase 
productivity and therefore are repellent to private investors. This argument has received 
a great deal of scholarly attention in the ‘‘race to the bottom’’ debate examining welfare 
expenditures (Bailey and Rom 2004; Lurie 1998; Schram 1998) and higher education 
(Bailey, Rom, and Taylor 2004). 
 
The flip side of tax competition and a race to the bottom in welfare spending may be 
that states compete in something like a ‘‘race to the top’’ to have public services that are 
attractive to business investors. Although the redistributive aspect of Peterson’s (1981, 
1995) argument has received more attention from political scientists, he also argues 
that state and local governments are pressured to increase developmental 
expenditures. In discussing why states may even occasionally choose to raise taxes to 
promote economic growth, Phillips (2004, 17) notes that ‘‘the market model posits that 
mobile actors are as concerned about the level and types of public goods that are 
provided by the states as they are with their annual tax bill.’’ Or, as Saiz (2001, 205) 
explains, businesses ‘‘shop’’ for the mix of public goods that they prefer. Keen and 
Marchand (1997, 49) demonstrate that interjurisdictional economic competition can lead 
to the ‘‘under provision of items that confer direct consumption benefits’’ and the ‘‘over 
provision of public inputs,’’ such as infrastructure investments. 
 
Bailey, Rom, and Taylor (2004) are agnostic about whether spending on higher 
education is developmental or redistributive and take an empirical approach to 
answering this question. They reason that if states view spending on higher education 
as redistributive, there will be a race to the bottom with states that spend more reducing 
spending more rapidly than states that spend less, and if states view spending on 
higher education as an investment, there will be a race to the top with states spending 
less increasing their expenditures more, ceteris paribus. They test these possibilities 
with two variables that allow for an examination of whether states that spend more on 
higher education than their neighbors reduce expenditures more rapidly than states that 
spend less than their neighbors on higher education. If anything, they find a race to the 
bottom for higher education, though this is not consistent across all models. 
 
Partisanship and Ideology 
Phillips (2004) finds that both economic competition and state politics influence state tax 
policy, and this might very well be the case here as well. Although early scholarship 
demonstrated that state politics had little influence on state budgets (Dye 1966), more 
recent work generally confirms an important if subtle role for state politics in determining 
the size (Alt and Lowery 2000) and composition of state budgets (Garand 1985; Hwang 
and Gray 1991; Jacoby and Schneider 2001). On balance, the strongest relationship 
between politics and spending is evident on welfare programs, whereas spending on 
education and highways appears relatively less dependent on political factors, perhaps, 
due to the more consensual and less ideological nature of these programs (Hwang and 
Gray 1991). Nonetheless, we believe it is wise to consider the relationship between 
politics and investment spending for the reasons stated below. 
 
Ideology and partisanship may have separate effects on spending, however. In general, 
although conservatives have traditionally been opposed to large budgets, they have 
been more favorably disposed toward spending on infrastructure that is thought to 
promote economic growth and development. In addition, the Democratic Party has been 
more clearly affiliated with the poor and working class, whereas Republicans have been 
more closely aligned with business. Therefore, taking spending levels as a given, we 
expect to see conservative and Republican states more likely to increase spending on 
developmental programs like education and highways (Nicholson-Crotty, Theobald, and 
Dan Wood 2006). Alt and Lowery (2000) find that changes in partisan control of 
government lead to changes in the size of the budget, and we also expect the greatest 
changes in the composition of spending following a change in party control. 
 
Data and Methods 
To examine the relationships discussed above, we examine data covering 49 states 
(excluding Nebraska because it has a nonpartisan legislature) for the time period of 
1965–2004. The number of cases varies depending on missing data and the lags used 
for the independent variables, but for each of our models, we have at least 1692 
observations. 
 
Dependent Variables 
We examine state own-source expenditures from 1965 to 2004 devoted to (a) 
highways, (b) higher education, and (c) K-12; since these are by far the largest 
expenditures that constitute investments in physical and human capital, all states 
support such programs and they have been in existence for the entire time period under 
review. Scholars typically measure state fiscal effort in one of three ways: by examining 
budget shares, by examining dollars spent (aggregate or per capita), or by examining 
spending as a share of the total potential resources that could be devoted to 
governments, such as GSP or state personal income. Depending on the measure of 
spending we choose, we could observe very different patterns in the data. As we noted 
above, while developmental spending has decreased as a percentage of the budget, in 
real terms, spending on developmental programs has increased. 
 
There are arguments in favor of each of these types of dependent variables. Regarding 
budget shares, scholars have convincingly argued that budget allocations to various 
programs are what Berry and Lowery (1990) call ‘‘Fixed Pool Simultaneous,’’ meaning 
that the size of the budget is determined prior to the allocations to particular categories 
(see also Nicholson-Crotty, Theobald, and Dan Wood 2006). If this is correct, then the 
appropriate question is, given a particular level of spending, how much is allocated to 
developmental programs? Using budget shares to programs that comprise the entire 
state budget would introduce problems associated with the analysis of compositional 
data and makes ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation procedures suspect (Katz and 
King 1999). Yet in this instance, we use changes to budget allocations to programs that 
comprise only about half of the typical state budget, meaning that strictly speaking, our 
budget data are not compositional, and if other assumptions hold, OLS is the correct 
estimation procedure.3 
3 If we were examining all budget categories in this analysis, our data would be compositional since changes in, say, eight of nine 
categories would perfectly predict change in the ninth category. Here, however, all programs could increase or decrease 
independently of one another (cf., Gray 1974) meaning that errors are not inherently correlated across equations and separate OLS 
regressions are appropriate. We can easily transform our data into compositional data by creating an ‘‘other’’ category and using 
appropriate compositional methods, but this is not necessary and OLS is much simpler to estimate and interpret. 
                                                          
 
Although it seems that budget makers start with general spending levels and then make 
allocation decisions, there are obviously other possibilities and using budget shares can 
also obscure some of the dynamics of state spending. For example, K-12 education 
spending has increased quite a bit since the 1960s, but looking only at budget shares, 
one does not get this impression. Rather than limiting themselves to a fixed amount, 
budgeters may decide to increase spending on developmental programs but increase 
spending more on other programs and proceed to do this by expanding the entire size 
of government. This suggests using either some dollar measure of spending or 
examining spending as a percentage of the economy. Each of these alternative 
measures to budget shares also has drawbacks. For example, the measure of spending 
as a percentage of personal income can change even without any changes in spending 
because of annual fluctuations in the amount of personal income. Similarly, measuring 
spending on a per capita basis will also be partly influenced by population changes 
rather than changes in fiscal policy; however, with the exception of rapidly growing or 
shrinking population states, these effects will be modest. Since each measure only 
paints part of the picture, we analyze all three types of dependent variables and present 
and discuss the influences on them. Specifically, our dependent variables are the 
change in budget shares devoted to these programs, changes in per capita 
expenditures on these programs, and changes in expenditures as a percentage of total 
state personal income, a measure of the total size of the state’s resources that could be 
potentially used for government.4 Thus, we present nine models below.5 The data come 
from the Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances for 
each year from 1965 to 2004. Given the differences in what these dependent variables 
measure, we do not expect the models to produce identical results and making firm 
conclusions will be somewhat difficult, yet this analysis will produce a more complete 
picture of the ways that the factors discussed above shape state spending on 
developmental programs. 
 
Independent Variables 
In each part of the analyses, we consider federal grants, economic growth cycles, 
intrastate competition in terms of demand for various programs, interstate economic 
competition, and the partisanship and ideology of state government. Federal grant data 
were also obtained from the Census Bureau Data Set. When considering budget shares 
and share of personal income, the Federal grants variable included in each equation is 
the percentage of total federal grants to the state comprised of the spending category of 
interest. For example, in the analysis examining highway spending, it is the percentage 
of total federal grants to the state intended for the highway program. We construct a 
4 We did consider examining this as a percentage of GSP; at any rate, the two variables are highly correlated. 
5 The summary statistics for variables for proportion of the budget are as follows with differenced values in parentheses: highway 
spending, 0.01 (20.11) to 0.29 (0.11) with mean of 0.11 (20.003) and standard deviation of 0.05 (0.017); higher education spending, 
0.05 (20.07) to 0.41 (0.06) with a mean of 0.18 (20.0005) and standard deviation of 0.06 (0.014); K-12 spending, 0.01 (20.20) to 
0.58 (0.22) with a mean of 0.23 (20.0004) and standard deviation of 0.08 (0.027). In per capita dollars: highways, 22.53 (20.491.09) 
to 1448.09 (706.34) with a mean of 203.94 (1.48) and standard deviation of 98.65 (43.20); higher education, 71.37 (20.207.08) 
to1013.50 (274.99) with a mean of 363.88 (11.30) and standard deviation of 143.87 (31.25); K-12 education, 7.54 (2.690.84) to 
2354.34 (640.98) with a mean of 487.53 (15.10) and standard deviation of 249.98 (58.37). As a percentage of personal income: 
highways, 0.001 (20.01) to 0.045 (0.02) with a mean of 0.01 (20.0002) and standard deviation of 0.005 (0.002); higher education, 
0.004 (20.009) to 0.037 (0.009) with a mean of 0.016 (0.0001) and standard deviation of 0.006 (0.001); K-12 education, 0.001 
(20.02) to 0.073 (0.03) with a mean of 0.021 (0.0002) and standard deviation of 0.008 (0.003). 
                                                          
similar measure for each of the other spending areas. In the per capita expenditure 
models, the relevant variable is per capita federal grants, and in the share of personal 
income model, it is grants as a share of personal income. 
 
To account for the cyclical nature of investment spending, we include a measure of the 
state’s personal income growth rate in the budget share model. This variable is the 
percentage growth rate and ranges from positive values during periods of economic 
expansion to negative values during recessions. We expect that during periods of 
economic expansion, we should see increases in expenditures in each of our spending 
areas. Since personal income growth is already included in the dependent variable for 
the personal income share models, we do not include this variable in those models. For 
the per capita spending models, we include a measure of the change in per capita 
personal income. 
 
It is also necessary to consider the competing demand for various forms of spending 
which may positively or negatively shape state investment spending depending on the 
levels of demand (Nicholson-Crotty, Theobald, and Dan 2006; Dye 1988). The variables 
that we use in the analyses below are K-12 enrollment (for education), the number of 
Registered vehicles in each state (for highways), and the number of Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children/Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (AFDC/TANF) recipients 
to control for the counterdemand for welfare and health care spending (for both 
education and highways).6 To test for the possibility of trade-offs, we include the 
demand variable associated with alternative programs since including the actual 
spending for alternative programs in the equations can produce biased estimates (Berry 
and Lowery 1990; Nicholson-Crotty, Theobald, and Dan Wood 2006). The demographic 
data were collected from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, which are now 
available on the US Census Bureau Web Site. We use the number of individuals per 
thousand population in the budget share and personal income share models. In the per 
capita spending models, we use the change in the raw number. 
 
We consider both partisan control and ideology as political determinants of spending. 
The updated data set of Fording and Berry is used for the Government ideology variable 
(cf. Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson 1998). This variable should have a negative 
influence on the budget share models since liberal governments will spend relatively 
less on developmental spending but should have a positive coefficient in the equation 
with the other two dependent variables because liberal governments will likely spend 
more money overall on all government functions. The data for the partisan control of 
government were collected from The Book of the States (Council of State Governments 
1964–2004). We created three partisan control variables: one representing Unified 
Republican control of the legislature, one representing Unified Democratic control, and 
one denoting a Republican Governor. Because it has a unicameral nonpartisan 
legislature, Nebraska was excluded from the analysis. Since budgets should be most 
likely to change with a shift in partisan control (Alt and Lowery 2000), we use the 
6 Federal welfare reform legislation led to important changes in eligibility for welfare programs which may threaten the validity of 
combining AFDC/TANF recipients in one variable. However, the reduction in AFDC recipients in the year prior to the passage of 
welfare reform (1995–96) was nearly equal to the reduction in 1996–97 indicating that welfare reform probably does not threaten the 
validity of this measure. 
                                                          
change in partisan control. For example, if the legislature came under unified control of 
the Republican Party, the variable Unified Republican would take on the value of 1, and 
if it switched from Unified Republican to some other partisan arrangement, this variable 
would take on the value of 21; if the Republicans maintained their status, it would be 
coded as 0. The other party control variables are coded similarly. Since we examine 
changes in, rather than party control itself, the fact that Democratic states in the South 
were also conservative does not confound the effects of party and ideology in that 
region. 
 
To examine the effects of regional economic competition, we need to examine how 
states respond to changes in their competitors’ developmental spending. To do this, we 
follow the procedure used by Bailey, Rom, and Taylor (2004) to examine the influence 
of competition on state spending on higher education. Specifically, we created two 
variables that examine how states respond to changes in spending by neighboring 
states, which are the states most likely to compete with one another (Bailey, Rom, and 
Taylor 2004). The first variable is called convergence, which is the difference between 
the average percentage of the budget allocated to a given budget program in 
neighboring states and the state’s own percentage allocated to the program. The 
second variable is called competition and is simply the value of the convergence 
variable where it is greater than 0. These two variables together allow us to examine 
whether states with a relatively higher proportion of their budget devoted to 
developmental programs reduce allocations more or less rapidly than states that spend 
less than their neighbors on developmental programs. In the absence of interstate 
competition, neighboring states may still have similar spending patterns for any number 
of reasons implying that states with relatively higher spending than their neighbors 
would spend less in the future; the convergence variable coefficient would thus be 
negative and significant, whereas the competition variable coefficient would not be 
significant. In a race to the bottom, coefficients for both variables would be negative and 
significant, indicating that states with greater allocations to developmental programs 
than their neighbors reduce allocations and that they reduce them more rapidly than 
states with lower allocations to these programs. In a race to the top, the convergence 
variable coefficient should not be significant since all states will be increasing 
expenditures, whereas the competition variable coefficient would be negative and 
significant, indicating that high spending states increase expenditures less rapidly. 
 
Model Specification 
Our data are time series cross-sectional which can present several potential estimation 
problems that have been discussed at length, most notably by Beck (2001) and Beck 
and Katz (1995). First, unobserved variables are likely to have unit-specific or time-
specific effects that are not captured in the measured independent variables. For 
example, states have various K-12 funding mechanisms which cause wide 
discrepancies in the dependent variable absent the influence of any of the theoretically 
interesting causal factors that we wish to investigate. These differences, if uncontrolled, 
can cause heteroskedasticity since our statistical model will better explain the variation 
in some units than others. To control for these unit-specific and time-specific effects, we 
estimate two-way fixed-effects models. 
 
Two additional problems that are common with time series data are autocorrelation of 
residuals and the presence of a unit root (i.e., integration). Each problem is present to a 
degree in the various models presented below. The raw dependent variables are not 
integrated but are, perhaps, most accurately described as near integrated.7 Some of the 
models using these data also demonstrate positive autocorrelation in the residuals. A 
common approach when data are integrated is differencing, which does eliminate such 
problems in this case. Unfortunately, this procedure exacerbates problems of 
autocorrelation by creating residuals that are negatively autocorrelated for one or two 
periods depending on which spending variable is used.8 Integration and autocorrelation 
can both produce estimation problems, but the autocorrelation problems can be 
addressed rather easily by including lags of the dependent variable on the right-hand 
side of the model. Therefore, we differenced the dependent variables and include the 
appropriate number of lags of the dependent variable to eliminate autocorrelation in the 
residuals for each of the models. We also tested for more complicated dynamics than 
one period lags, but these models did not fit the data well.9 Given the dependent 
variables, we also differenced the independent variables, except in the cases of the 
state ideology variable which changes very little within states in a given year and the 
competition and convergence variables since we think that given the dynamics of 
competition, states will react to their neighbor’s level of spending in the last budget cycle 
rather than the recent changes in their expenditure patterns. 
 
Choosing the proper lag length between the independent and dependent variables is 
not entirely straightforward since some states have annual budget cycles, whereas 
other states use a biennial process. Even in states that use a biennial process, 
however, mid-cycle adjustments are possible, and therefore, we use one period lags in 
the models presented below. Our choice of lagging the competition variable allows for 
the use of relatively simpler estimation procedures (Bailey, Rom, and Taylor 2004) than 
if we chose to model contemporaneous changes which would require the use of 
simultaneous or two-stage equations (see Phillips 2004). This choice of using a one 
period lag is more than a statistical convenience as it reflects a statement about the 
causal process by which states respond to their competitors. Essentially, our model 
assumes that states do not respond immediately to changes in the expenditure patterns 
of their competitors but do respond rather quickly (in the next period). We find this to be 
the best approximation of reality, especially, since many states have biennial budgeting. 
We did examine various lag lengths, for each model, and use a second lag in the higher 
education models. 
 
Influences On State Developmental Spending 
Tables 1, 2, and 3 show models of our spending variables for highways, higher 
education, and K-12 education, respectively, regressed on the independent variables 
7 A simple autoregression equation indicates coefficients ranging from 0.91 to 0.96 for the nine dependent variables. 
8 We tested for autocorrelation using Lagrange Multiplier tests. 
9 Specifically, we considered the possibility of error-correcting relationships between the dependent variables and some of the 
independent variables and also the possibility of the presence of a linear trend, which seemed particularly likely in the case of 
highway spending which has declined steadily over the last few decades. Neither of these processes fit the data well judging by the 
persistence of autocorrelation. 
                                                          
discussed above. In each table, the first column presents the analysis examining 
spending as a share of the budget, with the per capita models in the middle, and the 
personal income share models on the right. We include fixed effects for both states and 
years but do not present the results because they are of little substantive interest. 
 
Beginning with the highway spending model, we can see with the negative and 
significant coefficient on the lagged dependent variable that regardless of the 
dependent variable, a large increase in spending is unlikely to be followed by an 
additional large increase in spending (see table 1). As expected, the convergence 
variable is negative and significant across all models demonstrating that states 
spending a relatively high amount compared to their neighbors will spend less in the 
next period and vice versa. In the per capita expenditure models, the coefficient for the 
demand variable, registered vehicles, is positive and significant, but whereas positive, it 
is not significant in the other models. The federal highway grant variable is significant in 
the budget share model and is positive but insignificant in the remaining models (though 
nearly significant in the personal income share model). The ideology variable is 
negatively signed and significant in all models, indicating that liberal governments will 
allocate less money as a proportion of total spending to highways, as expected, but will 
also allocate fewer resources overall than less liberal states controlling for other factors. 
The personal income variable demonstrates that increases in economic growth will be 
followed by a greater proportion of the budget allocated to highway spending, perhaps, 
because the greater growth alleviates some of the pressure to increase- 
 
 
 
alternative types of social spending. Highway spending responds most consistently to 
past spending changes, government ideology, and the spending patterns of other 
states, with other variables attaining statistical significance depending on the model. 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the three models for higher education spending. Like 
highway spending, the lagged dependent variable coefficient is negative and significant 
in each model. To correct for autocorrelation, we include two lags of the dependent 
variable, and both are negative and significant, indicating that a large increase in 
allocations to higher education will limit additional allocations for 2 years. In addition, the 
federal grant variable is positive and significant across all three dependent variables, 
indicating that regardless of how we measure state higher education effort, federal 
education grants are an important determinant of state spending on higher education.10 
In the budget share model, the personal income variables and the AFDC/TANF variable 
are also significant in the expected direction, but they are not in the other models. The 
significant finding for the AFDC variable in the first higher education model is consistent 
with Kane, Orszag, and Gunter’s (2002) study finding that expansions in eligibility for 
the Medicaid program (which is jointly funded by the federal government and states) 
have led to a reduction in state spending on higher education. However, we find that 
10 Due to data limitations, we were not able to separate higher education and K-12 education aid, but education aid has a 
statistically significant, positive coefficient, suggesting that this aid is also estimated to increase higher education spending. 
                                                          
increasing numbers of AFDC/TANF recipients leads only to a relative and not absolute 
reduction in higher education expenditures. 
 
 
As with highway spending, the convergence variables are negative and significant in all 
three models, indicating that states spending more than their neighbors will increase 
spending to a lesser extent than their neighbors who spend less. Surprisingly, none of 
the political variables are significant predictors of spending on higher education. 
 
Turning to the K-12 spending models (table 3), we again see that the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable is negative in all three models but is significant in only the 
budget share model in column 1. This indicates that states that spend a large proportion 
of their budget on K-12 increase that proportion less substantially, but this relationship 
does not hold for the other models. Federal grants are also positive and significant in 
the budget proportion model but not in the models analyzing the other dependent 
variables. The lack of significance for the coefficients of these variables is surprising. 
The coefficient for the personal income variable is significant and positive in both 
models in which it is included, indicating that when there is positive economic growth, 
states will invest more in K-12 education. We again see a negative relationship between 
the number of AFDC/TANF recipients and education spending, but for this spending 
area, the relationship is negative and significant across all three dependent variables. 
This indicates that there is a consistent relationship between increased demand for 
social service spending and a relative reduction in K-12 spending. In all three models, 
the coefficient for K-12 enrollment is positive, but only in the per capita spending model, 
does it achieve statistical significance. Unlike higher education spending, government 
ideology is a positive and significant predictor of state K-12 spending on a per capita 
basis and as a share of the state’s total personal income. It is not estimated to influence 
the proportion of the budget, however. 
 
As with the other two types of spending, the convergence variable is negative and 
significant across all three models. In the budget share model, the competition variable 
is also negative and significant indicating that states with higher spending as a 
proportion of their budget reduce relative expenditures on K-12 education to a greater 
extent than other states, evidence of a race to the bottom. This competition variable is 
negatively signed but not significant in the other models, which indicates that only 
budget shares (and not actual dollars or the percentage of spending on K-12 education 
as a percentage of personal income) demonstrate this dynamic. Thus, we can conclude 
that states with a higher share of their budgets devoted to K-12 have reduced this 
percentage to a greater extent, but this has not translated into fewer resources overall 
devoted to K-12 education. 
 
Though there are commonalities across our models, we do note a number of 
differences in each spending area and dependent variable. Each category of spending 
has its own dynamic to a certain extent, as does each type of dependent variable. For 
example, higher education seems very responsive to federal grants, whereas K-12 
education seems less so. Overall, education spending programs appear very 
responsive to competing demands for dollars in the form of more AFDC/TANF 
recipients, but this seems to have no effect on highway expenditures except when 
conceived of in terms relative to other forms of spending (first model in table 1). The 
influence of demands for competing spending varies by program, but the findings for 
education fit our view of competition for scarce resources at the state level, with 
demands for consumption spending pitted against demands for investment spending, 
confirming the research of Nicholson-Crotty, Theobald, and Dan Wood (2006) and fitting 
in to the larger discussion of budgetary trade-offs (Berry and Lowery 1990; Hendrick 
and Garand 1991). 
 
The influence of all these independent variables is also dependent on the way in which 
spending is measured, and our different measures of state spending are designed to 
assess different things. For example, the federal grant variable is positive in all models 
save one but is only significant across all the models for higher education spending. 
This indicates that K-12 and highways grants do not lead to an overall expansion of 
spending to facilitate increases for these programs; instead, these federal grants 
influence states to reallocate money across different programs in the state budget. For 
higher education, it does appear that the states will actually increase per capita 
expenditures as well as their share of per capita income, evidence of the oft-noted 
flypaper effect. 
 
The measure of personal income was significant in both models that included it for K-12 
education but only in the budget share models for higher education and highways. For 
K-12 spending, higher amounts of per capita personal income growth lead to greater 
per capita expenditures. For the other two types of spending, personal income growth 
leads to more allocations to these programs as a proportion of the budget, but not more 
expenditures. It is possible that demand for other types of spending is lessened during 
periods of economic expansion, and this is reflected in a greater relative allocation to 
higher education and highways. 
 
The convergence variable was significant in all the models providing further evidence 
that neighboring states share similar spending patterns over time. This is an important 
observation, though, in the future, scholars should more carefully consider the 
mechanism by which states respond to one another’s spending patterns. There does 
not seem to be any consistent evidence of a race to the top or bottom in developmental 
spending, however. 
 
Notable across all models is the general lack of significance for the coefficients of the 
partisanship variables. As noted at the outset of the article, these types of spending are 
generally viewed as less political than redistributive spending, and perhaps, it is 
therefore not very surprising that partisanship does not influence developmental 
spending. However, our analysis indicates that politics is an important determinant of 
state developmental spending. Ideology had a strong and consistent influence on 
spending on highways and K-12 education, though it had no effect on higher education 
spending. This indicates that liberal states spend less on highways but more on K-12 
education, regardless of how spending is measured. 
 
Conclusion 
These models demonstrate the factors that on average determine state allocations to 
developmental programs. But our analysis of state spending patterns allows for some 
commentary regarding why relative state allocations to developmental programs have 
been reduced in recent years. For example, personal income growth is an important 
determinant of spending; however, it has generally slowed in recent decades. In the 
boom of the latter half of the 1990s, personal income grew in real terms approximately 
2% per year, compared to approximately 4% per year in the boom years of the late 
1960s. Of course spending on investment programs will be greater when fewer people 
need the services of even the limited welfare state that exists in the United States 
because they are making a better living. It is also possible that during periods of rapid 
economic growth, people have more confidence in and are therefore more willing to 
invest in the future. This appears to be the most important for K-12 spending. 
 
Like economic growth rates, the emphasis on developmental or investment programs in 
federal grants to the states has decreased over the last few decades. In the latter half of 
the 1960s, approximately 59% of money that the federal government sent to the states 
was devoted to education or highway spending. In contrast, by 2004, only 27% of 
federal grants to the typical state were intended for use in these developmental 
programs. The reasons for this shift are well known. The federal and state governments 
have increased eligibility for various health and welfare programs, the costs of which 
have expanded rapidly. In Alabama, for example, the limit for Medicaid eligibility is only 
about 26% of the poverty line. Further, in many instances, programs like Medicaid 
require state matching funds. With health care costs increasing well above the rate of 
inflation, we can expect that additional pressures will be applied to states to increase 
spending on health care programs. Since states are generally limited in terms of the 
debt they can accumulate, this will often lead to downward pressure on state 
developmental and investment spending. The states may also face added pressures to 
show that current allocations are used effectively. In our analyses, grants were 
consistently influential for higher education, and federal and state policymakers may 
want to ensure that the money is spent wisely. 
 
As the resource requirements of other programs expand in the coming years with 
greater health care costs projected well into the future, states will continue to grapple 
with these difficult issues. Recognizing their precarious fiscal position, many public 
universities are now essentially public in name only, with tuition rates little different from 
private universities and many troubling implications for quality and access (Ehrenberg 
2006). Similarly, privatizing state highways by providing long-term leases to private 
companies that are responsible for maintenance has become a serious option for many 
states (Kim 2006). Unfortunately, given the generally lower rates of economic growth 
and the lack of emphasis on developmental programs in federal aid to the states, it does 
not appear that this situation will ease any time soon. 
 
We believe we have a decent understand of why states have made certain budgetary 
decisions in recent years regarding investment spending. Given the states’ funding 
decision regarding highways and higher education, it seems safe to assume that state 
budgeters do not feel as if they have the necessary resources to adequately fund these 
programs. This is clear given budgetary inadequacies in higher education in many 
states and recent discussions of severe underfunding of highway and bridge 
maintenance. Yet, critics of government spending are correct in pointing out that in 
virtually all government programs, states spend much more in inflation adjusted dollars 
than they did many years ago. This is even true of developmental programs, though as 
we noted at the outset, spending on these programs has increased much less rapidly 
than other types of programs. Identifying the ‘‘correct’’ level of government expenditure 
on a given program is a perennially vexing subject for policy makers, but it seems that 
many people in the United States believe that we should certainly be doing more of 
something to develop our human and physical capital, whether or not this necessarily 
requires additional expenditures. 
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